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Recent Decisions
Admiralty - Recent Extensions Of The Ryan Indemnity
Doctrine. Italia Societa per Azioni di Navigazione v.
Oregon Stevedoring Co.. ...... U.S ....... 84 S. Ct. 748 (1964)
and American Export Lines v. Norfolk Shipbuilding &
Drydock Corp.. ...... F. 2d ...... (4th Cir. 1964). In Ryan
Stevedoring Co. v. Pan Atlantic S.S. Corp., 350 U.S. 124
(1955), a stevedoring contractor was held liable to indemnify a shipowner for damages the shipowner was required to pay to a longshoreman for injuries resulting from
stevedore's improper stowage of cargo rendering the ship
unseaworthy. Although there were no express warranties
in the service contract, the Court stated that the contractual undertaking to perform "properly and safely" is the
stevedore's "warranty of workmanlike service that is
comparable to a manufacturer's warranty of the soundness
of it's manufactured product." Id. at 1334. See Note, The
Ryan Doctrine: Present Stature and Future Delevopment,
37 TuL. L. REV. 786 (1963).
The stevedore's warranty of workmanlike service was
extended in Oregon to latent defects in equipment which
he provides. The stevedore had contracted with the shipowner to furnish equipment and supervision and to be
responsible for damage caused by its negligence. A longShoreman recovered from the shipowner for personal injuries caused by a defective rope supplied by the stevedore
which had created a condition of unseaworthiness. The
shipowner sued the stevedore for indemnification upon the
breach of its implied warranty of workmanlike service.
Negligence was not proved since the rope's defect was
latent, and the district court held that the contract provision which specifically provided for indemnity by the
stevedore in case of negligence negated the inference of
implied warranty of workmanlike performance. The Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed for the defendant, not
on the theory of a negation of implied warranty, but on
the basis that the implied warranty did not extend to nonnegligent conduct. Only the latter issue was before the
Supreme Court which reversed and held that the stevedore's implied warranty of workmanlike service is breached
when the stevedore non-negligently supplies defective
equipment which injures one of its employees during the
course of stevedoring operations. The court based its conclusion on the policy that liability should fall upon the
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party best situated to adopt preventive measures. See
Reid v. the Yoka, 377 U.S. 410 (1963); see generally Stover,
Longshoreman-Shipowner-Stevedore; The Circle of Liability, 61 MICH L. REv. 539 (1963); Note, Shipowner or
Stevedore: Liability to Injured Longshoreman, 67 DIcK
L. REV. 391 (1963).
The Ryan doctrine was further extended in American
Export Lines to allow indemnity for attorney fees and
litigation expenses incurred by the shipowner in successfully defending a suit brought by an employee of defendant shipyard for injuries sustained while working on the
ship. The shipowner requested that the shipyard defend
the suit, and when defendant refused, the shipowner filed
a third party complaint. A verdict absolved the shipowner from all liability; the shipyard was held to be solely
responsible for the employee's injuries, and, immediately
thereafter, the shipowner sought indemnity from the defendant for legal expenses. Equating the shipyard's warranty with that of the stevedore, the Fourth Circuit Court
of Appeals, by Judge Sobeloff, affirmed the district court's
award of indemnity and held that the shipowner was entitled to indemnification for legal expenses incurred as a
result of the shipyard's breach of warranty causing injury
for which the shipowner was potentially liable. See Strachan Shipping Co. v. Koninklyke Nederlandsche S.M.N.V.,
324 F. 2d 746 (5th Cir. 1963); Massa v. C.A. Venezuelan
Navigacion, 332 F. 2d 779 (2d Cir. 1964). The court reasoned that it would be placing a premium on losing law
suits to deny indemnity when a ship successfully defends
a suit. For further reference see Rederi A/B Dalen v.
Maher, 303 F. 2d 565 (4th Cir. 1962); Bielawski v. American Export Line, 220 F. Supp. 265, 270 (E.D. Va. 1963),
the lower court decision in the principal case, for a discussion of "potential liability".
Constitutional Law - Involuntary Line-Up Of Accuseds
Unable To Furnish Bail Violates The Fourteenth Amendment. Butler v. Crumlish, 229 F. Supp. 565 (E.D. Pa. 1964).
Plaintiffs, confined in a Philadelphia detention center for
want of bail, were ordered brought before a police line-up
for possible identification by victims of other crimes.
Plaintiffs brought suit under the Civil Rights Act, 14 Stat.
27 (1866), 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1958); 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1958),
to enjoin the police from requiring them to appear in the
line-up, claiming that the involuntary line-up would constitute an invidious discrimination depriving them of equal
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protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment since they would be forced to appear in the
line-up, while accuseds out on bail could only be requested
to appear. The district court granted a preliminary injunction on the basis that there was a meritorious claim
of constitutional right. The court reasoned that differences
naturally arising between imprisonment due to inability
to furnish bail and freedom on bail cannot be made the
basis of a constitutional objection because of discrimination since that distinction is constitutionally recognized.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; PA. CONST. art. 1, § 14. See
also Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4 (1951). However, the
constitutional authority for such a distinction does not
provide justification for any additional inequality which
is not inherent in the confinement itself. To treat the
accuseds, who are not convicts and are presumably innocent, not only as objects of custodial care but also as active
but involuntary participants in police investigation amounts
to a material distinction, not justified by constitutional
authority, between those who enter bail and those who
do not. Therefore, the court held that there was merit in
the plaintiffs' claim that they would be deprived of the
equal protection of the laws as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment if required to appear in the line-up.
In support of their decision the court cited only one case,
Commonwealth v. Brines, 29 Pa. Dist. 1091 (1920).
In Maryland, a person being held in custody for want
of bail for one crime may be required to appear for observation by victims of similar crimes if the police have
reasonable cause to believe that the accused committed
the similar crime. An accused who is free on bail in relation
to one crime may not be required to appear in a line-up
as a suspect in another similar crime; the police must obtain
sufficient evidence to constitute probable cause for arrest
on the new charge and must make such arrest before the
accused may be required to so appear. A person confined
in jail as a suspect in a crime, but not yet charged with
such crime, is required absolutely to appear in a line-up.
It is a practice in Maryland for an officer to tell accuseds
being held for want of bail to appear in a line-up as a
fill-in. There have been no strenuous objections by any
accused to this "apparent mild coercion" on the part of
the police officer in order to test whether one is required
to so appear. Telephone Conversation with Charles Moylan,
Jr., State's Attorney (October 29, 1964). For further information as to other inequalities arising under the bail
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system see: Foote, The Bail System and Equal Justice,
23 FED. PROB. 43 (Sept. 1959); Foote, Forward: Comment
on the New York Bail Study, 106 U. PA. L. REV. 685 (1958);
Comment, Compelling Appearances in Court: Administration of Bail in Philadelphia, 102 U. PA. L. REv. 1031-79
(1954). See generally 4 WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAw AND
PROCEDURE §§ 1807-23 (Anderson ed. 1957).
Constitutional Law - Mapp v. Ohio Applied Retrospectively. United States ex rel. Eastman v. Fay, 225 F.
Supp. 677 (S.D.N.Y. 1963). On March 14, 1956 petitioner
was convicted of the felony of possession of narcotics with
intent to sell. The conviction was obtained through the
use of evidence which was the fruit of an illegal search
and seizure. The state court, in 1962, denied petitioner's
writ of coram nobis stating that Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.
643 (1961), which prohibited in state trials the introduction of evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment, was prospective in operation and, therefore, did not
apply to petitioner's conviction which antedated that decision. People v. Eastman, 33 Misc. 2d 583, 228 N.Y.S. 2d 156
(King's Co. Court 1962). Petitioner then filed an application for a writ of habeas corpus on the grounds that his
Fourteenth Amendment rights had been violated. The
district court, in granting the writ, held that Mapp is retrospective in application and applies to a prisoner who has
been convicted and has exhausted his appeals prior to
Mapp, but subsequent to Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25
(1949), which "espoused the doctrine that there was a constitutional right to be free from unreasonable state intrusion upon privacy... but left the specific means of vindication open." The petitioner, therefore, at the time of his
arrest, had a constitutional right to be free from arbitrary
intrusion by the police, and that right was violated by the
illegal search and seizure. The court reasoned that the
violation of a constitutional right is a continuing one and,
therefore, the exclusionary rule of the Mapp case was applicable to vindicate the petitioner's right even though he
had exhausted his appeals prior to that decision. 225 F.
Supp. at 679, 681.
The question of the retroactive application of the Mapp
decision has given rise to a conflict of decisions. Comment,
62 MICH. L. REV. 1250, 1251 (1964). Some courts have held
that Mapp is to be applied only prospectively. United
States ex rel. Linkletter v. Walker, 323 F. 2d 11 (5th Cir.
1963); Gaitan v. United States, 317 F. 2d 494 (10th Cir.
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1963); Taylor v. People,. ..... Colo ....... ,392 P. 2d 294 (1964).
The courts that support prospective application rely upon
a deterrent theory as the purpose behind the law in Mapp.
Bender, The Retroactive Effect of an Overruling Constitutional Decision, Mapp v. Ohio, 110 U. PA. L. REV. 650,
660 et seq. (1962). Those courts which have held Mapp
to be retroactive in application have done so on the basis
that the right of an individual to be free from arbitrary
state intrusion has existed since the Wolf decision. In
Hall v. Warden, 313 F. 2d 483, 495-6 (4th Cir. 1963), the
court held that exclusion of illegally seized evidence was
an essential part of the right of privacy recognized in the
Wolf case and that Mapp should be applied retroactively
to vindicate that right which existed in defendant at the
time of his arrest. See also Walker v. Pepersack, 316 F. 2d
119 (4th Cir. 1963); Reeves v. Warden, 226 F. Supp. 953,
960 (D. Md. 1964); Presley v. Pepersack, 228 F. Supp. 95,
104 (D. Md. 1964); Hurst v. People, 211 F. Supp. 387 (N.D.
Cal. 1962). The principal case, however, treats exclusion
as a constitutional procedure for enforcing the right to
privacy. See Morris, The End of an Experiment in Federalism - A Note on Mapp v. Ohio, 36 WASH. L. REV. 407, 435
(1961). For further reference see Bender, supra, 110 U.
PA. L. REV. 650 (1962); Traynor, Mapp v. Ohio at Large in
the Fifty States, 1962 DUKE L. J. 319 (1962); Note, 16
RUTGERS L. REV. 587 (1962).
Constitutional Law - Statute Requiring Belief In A
Supreme Being For Conscientious Objection Exemption
Violates The Fifth Amendment. United States v. Seeger,
326 F. 2d 846 (2d Cir. 1964). Defendant had sought an exemption from military service as a conscientious objector
because he felt that he could not "participate in actions
which betray the cause of freedom and humanity." However, because defendant's belief was based upon a moral
concern with the dignity and "worth of the individual"
and not upon "a belief in relation to a Supreme Being" as
required by Section 6(j) of the Universal Military Training and Service Act, 62 Stat. 612 (1948), as amended, 50
U.S.C. Appendix § 456(j) (1958), the draft board denied
the exemption. Thereafter, defendant was convicted by
the district court of refusing to submit to induction under
62 Stat. 622 (1948), 50 U.S.C. Appendix § 462 (1958). The
Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district
court and held that the requirement of a belief in a Supreme Being, no matter how broadly defined, constitutes
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a discriminatory classification which is violative of the due
process clause of the Fifth Amendment. The court stated
that such a classification cannot embrace all faiths validly
called "religions", for the term "religion" also comprehends "a pervading commitment to a moral ideal" rather
than to a supernatural power. 326 F. 2d at 853.
The right to exemption from combat service is a privilege which Congress can grant or deny at will, George v.
United States, 196 F. 2d 445 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 344
U.S. 843 (1952), but such a privilege cannot be granted on
unconstitutional conditions. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S.
513 (1958). In 1948 Congress included the requirement of
a "belief in a Supreme Being" in the conscientious objector
clause. For a history of the conscientious objector provision see: United States v. Jakobson, 325 F. 2d 409 (2d Cir.
1963) and Conklin, Conscientious Objector Provisions: A
View in the Light of Torcaso v. Watkins, 51 GEo. L. J. 252
(1963). The court's decision in the principal case is in
conflict with previous cases in which the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals upheld the constitutionality of the provision in question. Etcheverry v. United States, 320 F. 2d
873 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 930 (1963), Clark v.
United States, 236 F. 2d 13 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 352
U.S. 882 (1956); George v. United States, supra. See
Note, 50 GEo. L.J. 618 (1964). However, the court's decision is in accord with the recent Supreme Court decisions concerning the establishment clause. In Sicurella
v. United States, 348 U.S. 385 (1955), the Supreme Court
stated that the exemption authorized by Section 6(j)
is based upon the religious beliefs of the particular individual, not upon the religious tenets of an organization. The federal government cannot "pass laws or impose requirements which aid all religions as against nonbelievers, and neither can aid those religions based on
a belief in the existence of God as against those religions
founded on different beliefs." Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S.
488, 495 (1961). By "religion" the Supreme Court now
seems to mean "man's belief or disbelief in the verity of
some transcendental idea and man's expression in action
of the belief or disbelief." School District of Abington
Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 234 (1963) (concurring opinion of Brennan, J.), citing McGowan v. Maryland,
366 U.S. 420, 466 (1961) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.). The
Supreme Court has granted certiorari in the Seeger and
Jakobson cases. For a discussion of the cases see 36 AM.
JuR. Military § 23 (1963 Supp.); Comment, 48 MN. L.
REV. 771 (1964).
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Sales-Liability Of Cigarette Manufacturers For Cancer
Resulting From Smoking. Green v. American Tobacco Co.,
325 F. 2d 673 (5th Cir. 1963), cert denied, 377 U.S. 943
(1964); Ross v. Phillip Morris & Co., 328 F. 2d 3 (8th Cir.
1964). In each of these cases, the action was brought for
injuries, the incidence of cancer, allegedly resulting from
smoking defendants' cigarettes, but the two courts reached
opposite results. In Green, the trial court submitted the
case to the jury on the theory of implied warranty, instructing that "such implied warranty does not cover substances in the manufactured product, the harmful effects
of which no developed human skill or foresight can afford
knowledge." 325 F. 2d at 676. The jury returned a verdict for defendant. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals certified a question to the Supreme Court of Florida, asking
whether Florida law imposed absolute liability on a manufacturer and distributor of cigarettes for cancer resulting
from smoking even when the manufacturer and distributor
could not have known that users of the cigarettes would
be endangered. The Supreme Court of Florida, in Green
v. American Tobacco Company, ...... Fla ....... , 154 So. 2d
169 (1963), answered that such a manufacturer or distributor could be held liable, since his "actual knowledge or
opportunity for knowledge of a defective or unwholesome
condition is wholly irrelevant to his liability on the theory
of implied warranty." The court of appeals then reversed
the district court verdict for defendant and remanded the
case for a new trial, declining to enter a judgment for plaintiff because "the jury has not made any sufficient finding
on the question of reasonableness, that is, as to whether or
not the cigarettes were 'reasonably fit and wholesome'."
325 F. 2d at 677.
A direct contrast to this decision is afforded by Ross.
There, the court rejected plaintiff's contention that the
district court erred when it gave exactly the same instructions as the district court in Green. The court said that
Missouri law did not place defendant cigarette manufacturer under a duty of absolute liability under implied warranty for dangers which could not have been foreseen, but
a manufacturer is held as an insurer only against knowable
dangers and thus has an incentive to keep abreast of scientific knowledge. In Lartigue v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,
317 F. 2d 19 (5th Cir. 1963), as in Ross, the court ruled that
in Louisiana there is strict liability for manufacturers only
for a defective condition the harmful consequences of
which, based on the state of human knowledge, are fore-
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seeable. For other cigarette cancer cases see: Cooper v.
R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 234 F. 2d 170 (1st Cir. 1956)
and Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 295 F. 2d
292 (3d Cir. 1961).
In cases involving products for human consumption,
strict liabilty has often been imposed on the manufacturer
without regard to privity of contract between the litigants
for injuries caused by "knowable dangers". Prosser, The
Assault Upon the Citadel, 69 YALE L. J. 1099 (1960); RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 402A (Tent. Draft No. 7, 1962). This
imposition of liability has been on a warranty theory. But
see Greenman v. Yuba Power Products,Inc., 27 Cal. Rptr.
697, 377 P. 2d 900 (1962). However, disagreement arises as
to the scope of the manufacturers' implied warranty of
wholesomeness, Comment, 13 CATHOLIC U. L. REv. 40
(1964), and in the case of an unknown and undiscoverable
defect the problem of its scope is a new and troublesome
one. Note, 38 TuL. L. REv. 194 (1963). The Florida court,
in answering the certified question of Green, found actual
safety to be the only standard in that state for determining
the fitness of a product for human consumption. 154 So.
2d at 172-3. The Ross and Lartigue courts distinguished
between physical impossibility of obtaining knowledge of
a harmful condition and scientific inability to obtain such
knowledge due to a lack of human skill and determined
that injuries caused by unknown and undiscoverable defects are not risks within the scope of the implied warranty.
See also U. C. C., 8 MD. CODE Art. 95 B, § 2-314(2)(c)
(Cum. Supp. 1964). The recent Report of the Advisory
Committee on Smoking and Health to the Surgeon General
of the Public Health concludes that cigarette smoking is
dangerous to health and contributes substantially to mortality from certain specific diseases, including cancer. Public Health Service Publication No. 1103 (1964). Regulations have been issued providing that as of July 1, 1965 all
cigarette packs and cartons shall be required to carry a
warning of such health dangers on the label. TRADE REGULATION RULES: 29 Fed. Reg. 8324 (1964) and 29 Fed. Reg.
12626 (1964). See also U. C. C., 8 MD. CODE Art. 95B,
§ 2-314(2) (e) (Cum. Supp. 1964). However, there is considerable doubt that these regulations will actually go into
effect. See ATRR, No. 163 (Aug. 25, 1964).
Tort - Unborn Viable Child Is A "Person" Within
Wrongful Death Statute. Oldham v. Sherman, 234 Md.
179, 198 A. 2d 71 (1964). Plaintiffs brought suit for the
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wrongful death of a child en ventra sa mere. The mother
of the child suffered serious injuries due to the negligence
of the defendants. Her child, a full term viable foetus in
the ninth month of pregnancy, was also injured and was
delivered stillborn shortly thereafter. The Superior Court
of Baltimore City held that plaintiffs, suing as parents and
administrator of the child's estate, had no cause of action
because a viable child born dead was not "a person" within
Maryland Code art. 67, §§ 1 and 4 (Lord Campbell's Act),
allowing recovery by a parent if the wrongful act "is such
as would (if death had not ensued) have entitled the party
injured to recover damages," and article 93, §§ 18 and 112,
allowing the administrator to recover funeral expenses.
The Maryland Court of Appeals, in a 4-3 decision, reversed.
Basing its decision on Damasiewicz v. Gorsuch, 197 Md.
417, 79 A. 2d 550 (1951), in which the same court held
that a cause of action lay for the negligent blinding of a
child en ventra sa mere when suit was brought for its
prenatal injuries after it was born alive, the court held
that a viable child born dead was a "person" within Lord
Campbell's Act and the statute authorizing actions by administrators. The court reasoned that since the cause of
action arose at the time of the injury, there was "no more
reason why it should be cut off because of the child's death
before birth, than if it died thereafter"; therefore, the
action survives, and permits the plaintiffs to recover. Judge
Prescott, dissenting, argued that the rationale of Damasiewicz, as well as the underlying reason for the rules allowing recovery by unborn children in wills and inheritance
cases, is that the right of action is for the benefit of the
child and a suit by the surviving parents or the administratrix does not fall within this category (234 Md. at 192).
See Tucker v. Howard L. Carmichael& Sons, Inc., 208 Ga.
201, 65 S.E. 2d 909 (1951).
The traditional general rule is that "A person who negligently causes harm to an unborn child is not liable to
such a child for the harm", RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 869
(1939); 25 C.J.S. Death § 24 (1941); PRossER, TORTS §56
(3d ed. 1964); 16 Aaw. JUR. Death § 75 (1938). The trend
is definitely toward allowing recovery if the child is born
alive, Annot., 27 A.L.R. 2d 1256 (1953) supplementing,
Annot., 10 A.L.R. 2d 1059 (1950); Note 12 MD. L. REV. 223;
12 M.L.E. Infants and Minors § 16 (1961). As of now, very
few courts have gone as far as the Maryland court in allowing recovery if the child is stillborn. See Rainey v.
Horn, 221 Miss. 269, 72 So. 2d 434 (1954) and Verkennes
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v. Cornica, 229 Minn. 365, 38 N.W. 2d 838 (1949); Annot.,
10 A.L.R. 2d 639 (1950). For a comprehensive article advocating recovery when the child is born dead see Note,
The Impact of Medical Knowledge in the Law Relating to
PrenatalInjury, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 554, 556 (1962).

